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Abstract
In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in
game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection
approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results
derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By ‘‘qualitatively valid’’ we
mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection
increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to
higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous
examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In
particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant
for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even
when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate
intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player
games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number
of strategies n. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for n§8, which jeopardizes the predictive power of results
derived for weak selection.
Citation: Wu B, Garcı´a J, Hauert C, Traulsen A (2013) Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games. PLoS Comput Biol 9(12): e1003381. doi:10.1371/
journal.pcbi.1003381
Editor: Claus O. Wilke, University of Texas at Austin, United States of America
Received August 9, 2013; Accepted October 22, 2013; Published December 5, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Wu et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: BW, JG, and AT are supported by the Max Planck Society. CH is supported from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and
from the Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Fund, grant RFP-12-10. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: bin.wu@evolbio.mpg.de
Introduction
In evolutionary theory, weak selection means that differences in
reproductive success are small. If fitness differences are close
enough to zero, perturbation analysis allows to derive analytical
results in models of population dynamics. This approach has a
long standing history in population genetics, where selection is
typically frequency independent [1–4]. More recently, weak
selection has been introduced into evolutionary game theory [5].
If selection is weak, the outcomes of the game have only a small
impact on fitness. Possible interpretations of this assumption
include that the effects of the game under consideration are small
or that it represents only one of many factors influencing
reproductive success. A number of important analytical results
have been derived using weak selection as well as rare mutations in
finite populations [6–8].
In infinitely large populations, the intensity of selection merely
results in a rescaling of time, but does not affect the outcome of the
evolutionary dynamics [9,10]. This means that long-term results
under weak selection equally hold for arbitrary intensities of
selection, provided the population is infinitely large. For finite
populations it has been suggested that results obtained under weak
selection may remain valid when the selection intensity is no
longer weak [6,8]. Here, we show that in general this is not the
case. If population size is finite, the intensity of selection plays a
decisive role and can qualitatively change the outcome.
Let us illustrate this idea with an example. Consider the public
goods game discussed in [11]. Therein, d individuals are chosen
from a population of size N to play a public goods game.
Individuals choose whether to contribute a fixed amount to a
common pool at a cost c. The amount in the common pool is
multiplied by a positive factor r (1vrvd ) and distributed amongst
all participants. The game considers three strategies: Cooperators,
who contribute a fixed amount c to a common pool, defectors,
who do not contribute but benefit from the contributions of others,
and punishers, who contribute c and pay a cost c to impose a fine a
upon defectors. The game is devised to inspect the emergence of
altruistic punishment, a behavior commonly found in human
subjects [12]. The model assumes a standard Moran process [5],
in which one individual is chosen proportional to fitness f to
reproduce and its offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual.
Fitness is an increasing function of the payoff p from the game,
f~f (bp), where b is the intensity of selection [13]. In addition,
there is a small rate of mutations, such that a new mutant either
goes extinct or reaches fixation before the next one occurs [14,15].
This allows to approximate the dynamics by an embedded
Markov chain on the monomorphic states, with fixation proba-
bilities describing the transitions between those monomorphic
states. The stationary distribution of this Markov chain allows to
infer the relative abundance of different strategies. This approach
is used frequently to describe evolutionary games in finite
populations with more than two strategies [11,16–19]. Figure 1
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shows the strategy abundance in an imitation process for this
public goods game with punishment. Panel A illustrates the
outcome when payoffs are mapped onto fitness with an
exponential function, f~exp(bp), where b is the intensity of
selection [20]. For weak selection altruistic punishment is the
strategy most favored by selection, but this is not true for stronger
selection. Moderate intensities of selection change the picture in
favor of defection. This also holds when payoffs are mapped into
fitness with the linear function f~1{bzbp [5], as shown in
Panel B. Changes in the ranking of strategies also occur for larger
strategy sets [11,17–19] but for a concise illustration of our point
three strategies are sufficient.
In the example above, focusing only on the weak selection leads
to results that do not even qualitatively hold for higher intensities
of selection. The change in the order of strategies shows that, in
this case, the predictive power of weak selection to higher
intensities of selection is limited. However, many results on the
selection of strategies are based on weak selection [8,21]. In
particular, in the context of the evolution of cooperation, simple
analytical results derived under weak selection are popular
[6,7,22–25]. However, based on the above example a number of
questions arise: Are changes in the ranking of the frequencies of
strategies a common occurrence as selection increases? What
facilitates the change of ranks? The number of players? Or the
number of strategies? Or does it depend on specific assumptions
on the evolutionary dynamics? To answer these questions, we
formally study imitation processes in symmetric games. Our results
show that for games with two strategies, the ranking in strategy
abundance can change with the intensity of selection, provided the
number of players is more than two. Moreover, rank changes also
arise in pairwise games with more than two strategies, and it is
even highly likely in games with many strategies.
Results
We study imitation dynamics in finite populations using pure
strategies. While we could work with the Moran process discussed
above, we choose for convenience a slightly different process,
which is based on the pairwise comparison of two individuals. In
this case, only payoff differences matter. Thus the effective
parameter number is smaller (in a 2|2 game, only two
parameters are necessary and not four). This facilitates the
analysis (see Lemma 3 in SI). Even for a Moran process with any
payoff-to-fitness mapping [13], it is possible to establish payoff
matrices that lead to rank changes. In this case, the same outline of
proof applies, but involves a complicated multivariable analysis.
For a pairwise comparison rule, a randomly chosen individual a
reassesses its strategy by a probabilistic comparison of its payoff pa
to that of a randomly selected model member b with payoff pb.
With a probability given by the imitation function g(x) the focal
individual adopts the model’s strategy based on the payoff
difference between the focal individual and the model,
x~b(pb{pa), where bw0 is the selection intensity. We assume
that g(x) is a well defined probability for all real values of x. We
further use the popular assumption that mutations are rare
[11,17,26–29], such that populations are almost always mono-
morphous [14,15]. We follow the traditional convention that
mutants are restricted to a known finite set of strategies (similar to
the finite allele model in population genetics). The stochastic
dynamics is approximated by an embedded Markov chain with as
many states as strategies in the game (see Methods). The stationary
distribution of the associated Markov chain is a function of the
intensity of selection, b, and yields a ranking of strategies such that
the most abundant strategy is ranked first, the second most
abundant strategy is ranked second, and so on. In the limit of
vanishing selection, b?0, the payoff from the game does not
matter and all strategies have equal abundances. Increasing
intensity of selection makes some strategies more successful than
Figure 1. Average strategy abundance in compulsory public goods games with punishment [11], where d~5, r~3, c~1, a~1 and
c~0:3. The game has three strategies: cooperators contribute to the common pool, defectors exploit cooperators, and altruistic punishers contribute
to the common pool and punish defectors. The evolutionary dynamics are based on the Moran process in a population of size 100, where an
individual is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness f , which is an increasing function of its payoff p. Weak selection
implies that large payoff differences result in small fitness differences: A exponential payoff-to-fitness mapping, f~exp(zbp) [20,50] and B linear
payoff-to-fitness mapping, f~1{bzbp [11]. The dashed lines represents weak selection approximations. Vertical lines indicate the two selection
intensities where the ranking of strategies changes. In both cases, most favored strategy changes at moderate intensities of selection. Thus,
predictions based on weak selection results do not carry over to higher intensities of selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.g001
Author Summary
In evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations,
selection intensity plays a key role in determining the
impact of the game on reproductive success. Weak
selection is often employed to obtain analytical results in
evolutionary game theory. We investigate the validity of
weak selection predictions for stronger intensities of
selection. We prove that in general qualitative results
obtained under weak selection fail to extend even to
moderate selection strengths for games with either more
than two strategies or more than two players. In particular,
we find that even in pairwise interactions qualitative
changes with changing selection intensity arise almost
certainly in the case of a large number of strategies.
Weak Selection Predictions for Stronger Selection?
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others. This reflects appropriately in how strategies are ranked by
the stationary distribution. We assume that in the strong selection
limit, b??, even the strategy of only slightly better performing
model individuals is adopted with certainty, lim
x?z? g(x)~1 and
that, similarly, the strategy of only slightly worse performing model
indviduals is never adopted, lim
x?{? g(x)~0.
Games with two strategies
The abundance ranking of strategies is invariant under changes
of the selection intensity in 2|2 games for any imitation process
[30]. However, for the Moran process with arbitrary payoff-to-
fitness mappings, this does not necessarily hold: For example, in a
Moran process with linear payoff-to-fitness mapping, such effects
can appear in games with negative payoff entries when the
intensity of selection approaches its maximal value, as the
transition probabilities can approach zero in this case, leading to
rapid changes of the fixation probability.
Figure 2 shows that rank changes can readily arise for simple
imitation processes in games with three players, i.e., the minimal
group size of multiplayer games. In this example, the ranking
derived under weak selection carries over to any selection intensity
for the Fermi imitation function, g1(x)~1=(1zexp({x)). But for
the rescaled error function g2(x)~(1zerf(x))=2, which repre-
sents a qualitatively similar imitation function, the ranking
changes. It turns out that for any two-strategy game, the ranking
invariance holds for the imitation function g1(x), as a result of the
special property g1(x)=g1({x)~exp(x). For the imitation func-
tion g2(x), however, the criterion to determine that strategy 1 is
more abundant under weak selection differs from that under
strong selection. Section 3 of the SI shows technical details of these
results.
Why do similar functions lead to radically different results when
selection is not weak? The intuition behind is as follows: As shown
in the SI, the stationary distribution depends only on the product
PN{1k~1
g(zbDp(k))
g({bDp(k)). Here Dp(k) is the payoff difference between
strategy 1 and strategy 2, where k is the number of strategy 1
individuals in the population. The ranking can change when both
the product in the enumerator and the product in the denominator
converge to zero with increasing intensity of selection b. In this
case, not the imitation function, but its first derivative or
potentially its higher derivates far from zero matter, based on
L’Hopital’s rule.
In the SI, we show that even the monotonicity in the payoff
difference cannot ensure the invariance of ranking for any two-
strategy game and any imitation function (see Section 3 in SI). Yet
this monotonicity applies for all 2|2 games, where the invariance
property holds for any imitation function [30]. Therefore, we
conclude that in general, ranking invariance does not hold for two-
strategy games with arbitrary imitation processes. Since such
multiplayer games have only become popular recently [31–36],
this result may not be particularly surprising. However, in the next
Section we show that even for 3|3 games between two players,
ranking changes can occur.
Games with three strategies
For games with more than two strategies, i.e., nw2, the problem
is harder to tackle, because the stationary distribution does no
longer depend on a single ratio of fixation probabilities, but
becomes a more intricate rational function of all n(n{1) fixation
probabilities, see e.g. [11]. At first, we restrict ourselves to 3|3
games and show that weak selection results do not carry over to
stronger selection. Numerically we establish that this phenomenon
occurs very often in the case of games with randomly drawn payoff
matrices.
An example in which the ranking of strategies changes with the
intensity of selection was already provided in the introduction. To
go one step further, we provide a theorem for a more challenging
constraint in which the limits of both weak and strong selection are
identical, yet rank changes occur at intermediate selection
strengths.
Theorem 1 Consider any imitation process with a strictly increasing,
twice differentiable imitation function g(x). For a sufficiently large population
size N and any selection intensity b(0vbv?), there exists a 3|3
payoff matrix (aij)3|3 with the following two properties:
1. The stationary distribution is uniform for b~0 (as always) and for
b??.
2. At b, at least two strategies change their ranking.
Theorem 1 states that weak selection results cannot be
extrapolated to non-weak selection for 3|3 games (for a proof
by construction see Section 4 of the SI). This implies that the
ranking of strategies under weak selection has limited predictive
value for higher intensity of selection. The theorem also shows that
even if both weak selection and strong selection limits lead to the
same evolutionary outcome, the ranking of strategies can still
change at an intermediate selection intensity. This precludes the
robustness of conclusions based on both the weak selection
approximation and the strong selection.
In order to determine how frequent such rank changes occur or
how generic these games are, we analyze changes in the ranking of
strategies in random games [36–39]. In particular, we compute the
probability that rank changes occur and determine the number of
changes in the rank of strategies, see Figure 3. The numerical
procedure generates a random 3|3 matrix, where each entry is
drawn independently from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance one or a uniform distribution over the interval (0,1).
Strictly speaking, our numerical results are restricted to these two
sampling distributions for the payoffs. However, the results suggest
that the distribution has only a small influence on the number of
rank changes as shown in Figure 3B. We compute the strategy
abundances for an imitation process in the interval for b in (0,b^),
Figure 2. The rank invariance property is sensitive to the
imitation function for two-strategy multiplayer games. We
depict the average abundance of strategy 1 in a 2-strategy 3-player
game in a population of size N~100 as a function of selection intensity








2)dt is the error
function (see inset). The game is given by the table in the figure.
Invariance of ranking holds if and only if the curves never cross the 1=2
threshold. This threshold is crossed for imitation function g2 but not for
g1 , despite their similarity, see main text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.g002
Weak Selection Predictions for Stronger Selection?
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where b^ is chosen maximally while preventing numerical
overflows. We then count the number of rank changes between
all pairs of strategies. Note that the proof of Theorem 1 shows
implicitly that in random games a simultaneous rank change of all
three strategies occurs with probability measure zero. This is
because these games are located on a subspace with a lower
dimension than the space of games with intersections of pairs of
strategies (see Section 4.1 in SI).
Figure 3A shows an example where a randomly generated game
results in four rank changes. This illustrates that the ranking
obtained for weak selection cannot be used to extrapolate to non-
weak selection. The commonness of rank changes is estimated
based Monte Carlo simulations, see Figure 3B. With a probability
greater than 0:25 at least one rank change occurs but the
likelihood decreases rapidly with the number of rank changes.
The numerical approach shows that the construction provided
in Theorem 1 is relevant for a substantial fraction of random
games and does not merely represent a non-generic, special case.
It also shows that a larger number of rank changes may occur as
illustrated in Figure 3.
Games with more than three strategies
Theorem 1 states that 3|3 games exist in which the strategies
change their ranking in abundance. Naturally this also holds for
games with more strategies. To determine the probability and
numbers of such rank changes in random n|n games [36–39], we
generalize the numerical procedure described above.
Games with more than 3 strategies increase in complexity and,
as expected, increasing n leads to more rank changes. Let P(l,n) be
the probability that at least l changes in the abundance ranking
occur in random n|n games. Figure 4 shows that P(l,n) increases
rapidly with the number of strategies n if we assume that the
entries of the payoff matrix are sampled from either a uniform or a
Gaussian distribution. For n~4, the probability that the ranking
derived under weak selection is not valid for higher selection
intensity already exceeds one half. For n~8, it is almost 100%.
The numerical investigation of random games shows that with
many available strategies, the stationary distribution computed for
weak selection can be very different from the stationary
distribution obtained for larger intensities of selection. This is of
particular relevance in applications where behavioral diversity is
important [18,26].
Similarly, the expected number of rank changes for random
n|n games also increases with n, see Figure 4. In particular, for
n~5, the expected number of rank changes is already more than
one. Hence, for games with many strategies it is very likely that the
stationary distribution obtained under weak selection is qualita-
tively quite different from the stationary distribution obtained for
stronger selection.
Discussion
For two-strategy multiplayer games in well-mixed populations
under small mutation rates [14,15], we have shown that the
ranking of the average strategy abundance derived for weak
selection may change when increasing selection strength. More-
over, the ranking is sensitive to the details of the evolutionary
process, such as the choice of imitation functions.
In evolutionary games in finite populations the assumption that
mutation rates are sufficiently rare to consider pairwise invasions
between strategies is popular [11,17,26–29,40] and often the only
analytically feasible approach. However, it remains challenging to
interpret the analytical results for the stationary distribution for all
selection intensities [11]. Therefore, weak selection approxima-
tions [5,22] or strong selection limits [17,19,27] are often used to
obtain simpler analytical results that are easier to interpret.
Here, we have shown that already for 3|3 games, attempts to
extrapolate results derived in one of those simplifying cases may
often fail because even the qualitative features of the stationary
distribution, i.e. the ranking of strategy abundances, may change
as a function of the selection strength. In particular, the strategy
with highest abundance may change with the intensity of selection.
In fact, even considering the two limiting cases of the selection
intensity together is not enough. Our results show that even if
weak and strong selection limits lead to the same ranking, other
rankings can still arise for intermediates selection intensities. Thus,
we conclude that even though these extreme cases are insightful,
abundances at intermediate selection intensity levels have to be
considered as well to establish the generality of the results and
robustness of the conclusions.
An intuitive reason for changes in the abundance ranking of
strategies for 3|3 games in both the weak and strong selection is
based on risk dominance. For strong selection, the pairwise
probability current always flows towards the risk dominant
strategy [14], whereas for weak selection, the average abundance
Figure 3. Number of changes in the abundance ranking of strategies in 3|3 games. A Illustration of a particular game where selection
curves intersect 4 times, giving rise to 5 different rankings (from right to left population sizes N~30 – thick lines, N~40, N~50, N~60–thinner
lines). B Statistics over the number of rank changes in games with randomly drawn payoff entries. At least one rank change is obtained in about one
quarter of random games. The frequency of k rank changes decreases approximately exponentially with k. As an imitation function, we used the
Fermi function g1(x)~1=(1zexp({x)). Parameters: Uniform distribution with payoff values in (0,1), Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance
1, frequencies obtained by averaging over 2|106 independent samples.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.g003
Weak Selection Predictions for Stronger Selection?
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is based on the sum of the risk dominance conditions between all
different strategies [41].
We have focused solely on well-mixed populations and our
analytical considerations cannot easily be generalized to structured
populations. However, several papers on the evolution of
cooperation have shown that the ranking of the average
abundance of strategies can change in structured populations
even in 2|2 games [42–45]. Thus, this issue is also of interest in
structured populations, where the weak selection approximation is
particularly powerful [21,24,25,46], but for example fails to
predict the potential decrease of cooperation in the spatial
snowdrift game [42].
Our results have been obtained for imitation processes, i.e.
processes in which one individual probabilistically compares its
performance to another one and tends to adopt strategies of better
performing members of the population. The results derived for
three or more strategies assume rare mutations such that the
transition matrix of the embedded Markov chain M only depends
on the fixation probabilities of pairs of strategies. Therefore, all our
results immediately carry over to the Moran process with
exponential payoff-to-fitness mapping [20,47], because such a
Moran process has the same fixation probability as the imitation
process with imitation function 1=(1zexp({x)) for any intensity
of selection [20]. This fact illustrates that the existence of such rank
changes do not depend on the details of the microscopic
evolutionary process, but are a generic feature of evolutionary
games in finite populations.
Methods
We assume a finite well-mixed population of size N. For two
player games, individuals interact in pairs according to a
symmetric game given by the n|n matrix aij where n denotes
the number of strategies. A player with strategy i playing against
strategy j gets payoff aij . Payoffs are computed for every individual
assuming everyone interacts with everyone else in the population.
Figure 4. Occurrence of rank changes in random games. In the first row, we plot the estimated probability P(l,n) of getting at least l rank
changes as a function of the number of strategies n for uniformly distributed payoffs (Panel A) and Gaussian distributed payoffs (Panel B). In the
second row, we plot the estimated probability of getting at least l changes in the most abundant strategy as a function of the number of strategies n
for uniformly distributed payoffs (Panel C) and Gaussian distributed payoffs (Panel D). Finally, on the third row we show the expected total number of
rank changes for uniformly and Gaussian distributed payoffs (Panels E and F). Here, we used a Fermi imitation function g1(x)~1=(1zexp({x)) in a
population of size 30. Simulations: For each n, (2ƒnƒ9), 2|106 random n|n matrices are sampled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.g004
Weak Selection Predictions for Stronger Selection?
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For the multiplayer case, we follow the notation from [36].
Selection acts by comparing the payoffs of two randomly chosen
individuals. Individual a with payoff pa adopts the strategy of
individual b with payoff pb with probability g(b(pb{pa)), where
g(x) is called the imitation function. In an evolutionary process
individuals must be more likely to imitate a strategy that performs
better and hence we assume that g(x) is increasing, g’(x)w0 for all
x, and for technical reasons we require that g(x) is continuously
differentiable (with the exception of the proof of Theorem 1, which
requires twice continuous differentiability). This implies that
strategies achieving higher payoffs have a higher probability of
being represented in the next generation. The intensity of selection
is b§0. If b approaches zero, payoff differences have vanishingly
small effects on selection. We also assume that lim
x?{? g(x)~0
and lim
x?z? g(x)~1, which means that for infinite intensity of
selection, only the sign of pb{pa matters.
Variation in the population is generated by mutations. That is,
the imitation step described above happens with probability 1{m.
With probability m, a mutation occurs and the focal individual
adopts a uniformly chosen strategy. Without mutations it is
possible to compute the fixation probability wij , of a mutant
playing strategy i in a population of N{1 individuals playing j [5].
For small m, the dynamics is approximated by an embedded
Markov chain [14,15] with an n|n transition matrix M that is
fully determined by the n(n{1) different fixation probabilities wij
(Section 2 SI).
In a large class of evolutionary processes (where all transitions
between states are possible), the transition matrix M has a unique
stationary distribution for every b§0. More precisely, the
stationary distribution is unique whenever the Markov chain is
irreducible and aperiodic, and characterizes the average abun-
dance of each strategy in the long run [48,49]. The evolutionary
outcome we are interested in is the ranking based on the average
abundance on the set of strategies f1,2,:::,ng. The stationary










b~0. For weak selection, we obtain the ranking over the n
strategies by ordering the derivatives of the components of the
stationary distribution at b~0.
For the computational results, we determine the strategy
abundances for a random game as a function of the selection
strength, b, over the interval 0vbvb^, where b^ is dynamically
adjusted to avoid arithmetic overflow. We then count the number
of rank changes between any pair of strategies, i.e. changes in their
relative abundance for b in (0,b^). Random games are constructed
by sampling payoffs from an independent identical distribution,
which is either uniform or Gaussian. Averages are taken over
2|106 samples in all cases.
Our source code in Python is publicly available on figshare
(http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.814470).
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